An asymmetric primitive based on the Bivariate Function Hard Problem by Ariffin, Muhammad Rezal Kamel
ar
X
iv
:1
30
1.
69
63
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  3
1 J
an
 20
13
An asymmetric primitive based on the Bivariate
Function Hard Problem
Muhammad Rezal Kamel Ariffin1,2
1 Al-Kindi Cryptography Research Laboratory, Institute for Mathematical Research,
Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM)
2 Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM),
Selangor, Malaysia
rezal@putra.upm.edu.my
Abstract. The Bivariate Function Hard Problem (BFHP) has been in
existence implicitly in almost all number theoretic based cryptosystems.
This work defines the BFHP in a more general setting and produces an
efficient asymmetric cryptosystem. The cryptosystem has a complexity
order of O(n2) for both encryption and decryption.
1 Introduction
In Section 2 of this work, we define the Bivariate Function Hard Problem (BFHP)
and illustrate its existence within the RSA hard problem. We then proceed to
produce an asymmetric cryptosystem in Section 3 that thoroughly utilizes the
BFHP concept. In Section 4 we produce a table of comparison between known
asymmetric algorithms and the algorithm introduced in this work. We conclude
in Section 5.
2 Bivariate Function Hard Problem
The following proposition gives a proper an analytical description of the “Bi-
variate Function Hard Problem” (BFHP).
Proposition 1. Let F (x1, x2, ..., xn) be a multivariate one-way function that
maps F : Zn → Z+(2n−1,2n−1). Let F1 and F2 be such functions (either identical
or non-identical) such that A1 = F1(x1, x2, ..., xn), A2 = F2(y1, y2, ..., yn) and
gcd(A1, A2) = 1. Let u, v ∈ Z
+
(2m−1,2m−1). Let
G(u, v) = A1u+A2v (1)
If at minimum m−n− 1 = 129, it is infeasible to determine (u, v) from G(u, v).
Furthermore, (u, v) is unique for G(u, v) with high probability.
Remark 1. Before we proceed with the proof, we remark here that the diophan-
tine equation given by G(u, v) is solved when the parameters (u, v) are found.
That is, the BFHP is solved when the parameters (u, v) are found.
Proof. We begin by proving that (u, v) is unique for each G(u, v) with high
probability. Assume there exists u1 6= u2 and v1 6= v2 such that
A1u1 +A2v1 = A1u2 +A2v2 (2)
We will then have
Y = v1 − v2 =
A1(u1 − u2)
A2
Since gcd(A1, A2) = 1 and A2 ≈ 2
n, then the probability that Y is an integer is
2−n.
Next we proceed to prove that to solve the diophantine equation given by G(u, v)
is infeasible to be solved. The general solution for G(u, v) is given by
u = u0 +A2t (3)
and
v = v0 −A1t (4)
for some integer t. To find u within the stipulated interval (u ∈ (2m−1, 2m − 1))
we have to find the integer t such that 2m−1 < u < 2m − 1. This gives
2m−1 − u0
A2
< t <
2m − 1− u0
A2
.
Then the difference between the upper and the lower bound is
2m − 1− 2m−1
A2
=
2m−1 − 1
A2
≈
2m−2
2n
= 2m−n−2.
Since m− n− 1 = 129, then m− n− 2 = 128. Hence the difference is very large
and finding the correct t is infeasible. This is also the same scenario for v.
Remark 2. It has to be noted that the BFHP in the form we have described has
to be coupled with other mathematical considerations upon F1, F2, u, v to yield
practical cryptographic constructions.
Definition 1. Let the tuple (M, e, d, p, q) be strong RSA parameters. Let N =
pq, ed ≡ 1(mod φ(N)) and φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). From C ≡ M e(mod N) we
rewrite as
C(M, j) =M e −Nj (5)
where j is the number of times M e is reduced by N until C(M, j) is obtained.
The problem of determining (M, j) from equation (5) is the RSA BFHP. The
pair (M, j) is unique with high probability for each C(M, j).
Remark 3. With little effort, one can also produce a BFHP for the discrete log
problem (DLP). Analysis could also be done within the framework given for the
RSA-BFHP.
The following 3 analytical results gives a clear picture regarding the RSA-BFHP.
All result re-affirms the “infeasibility” of trying solve the RSA problem. We also
produce a corollary that may shed some light regarding the RSA problem and
integer factorization.
Lemma 1. The RSA BFHP is infeasible to be solved.
Proof. Let X =M e. From
C(X, j) = X −Nj (6)
the general solution is
X = X0 −Nt
and
j = j0 + t
for some t ∈ Z. It is easy to deduce that the correct t belongs in the interval
(2k(e−1)−1, 2k(e−1)− 1). Current RSA deployment has k = 1024. Hence, to solve
the RSA BFHP is infeasible.
Lemma 2. RSA problem ≡p RSA BFHP
Proof. From C ≡ M e(mod N) if the RSA problem is solved then M is found.
Hence, j = M
e
−C
N
is also found. Thus, the RSA BFHP is solved.
From C(X, j) = X − Nj, if the RSA BFHP is solved means that (M, j) is
found. Thus, the RSA problem is solved.
Corollary 1. Solving RSA BFHP does not imply successful factoring of N =
pq.
Proof. From Remark 1, if RSA BFHP is solved then (M, j) is found. That is,
M = e
√
C +Nj
and
j =
M e − C
N
.
It is obvious that the factoring of N was not obtained.
3 A new asymmetric cryptosystem based on the BFHP
3.1 Common values
This scheme is to facilitate secure communication asymmetrically between 2 par-
ties namely A (Along) and B (Busu). For both of them there will 2 sets of public
parameters determined pre-communication and a common n-bit prime number.
The party that initiates the communication will utilize the set G1 = (g1, g2)
while the other party will utilize the set G2 = (g3, g4). These public parameters
are co-prime to each other and belong in the interval (2n−1, 2n−1). In fact both
parties will have keys generated by both sets for the eventuality of either initiat-
ing communication or accepting incoming information. In this work we assume
Along is initiating while Busu is accepting secure information.
• Key Generation by Along -sender
INPUT: The public prime number p, the public sets G1 and G2.
OUTPUT: A public key for sending information eA, an ephemeral private
key dA for generating eA and a secret pair (α1, α2).
1. Generate a random private key dA within the interval (2
n−1, 2n − 1).
2. Compute α˜1 ≡ g1dA(mod p).
3. Compute α˜2 ≡ g2dA(mod p).
4. Generate two random and distinct n-bit ephemeral keys kA1 and kA2.
5. Compute the secret integers α1 = α˜1 + kA1p and α2 = α˜2 + kA2p. Both α1
and α2 belong in the interval (2
2n−1, 22n − 1).
6. Let eA = g3α1 + g4α2.
• Key Generation by Busu -recipient
INPUT: The public prime number p, the public sets G1 and G2.
OUTPUT: A public key for receiving information eB, an ephemeral private
key dB for generating eB and a secret pair (β1, β2).
1. Generate a random private key dB within the interval (2
n−1, 2n − 1).
2. Compute β˜1 ≡ g3dB(mod p).
3. Compute β˜2 ≡ g4dB(mod p).
4. Generate two random and distinct n-bit ephemeral keys kB1 and kB2.
5. Compute the secret integers β1 = β˜1 + kB1p and β2 = β˜2 + kB2p. Both β1
and β2 belong in the interval (2
2n−1, 22n − 1).
6. Let eB = g1β1 + g2β2.
• Encryption by Along
INPUT: The public key tuple (eA, eB), and the message M which is n-bits
long and less than p.
OUTPUT: The ciphertext C.
1. Upon informing Busu of the intention to send secure data, Along receives
Busu’s public key eB.
2. Along then generates eAB ≡ dAeB ≡ (mod p).
3. Along then generates the ciphertext C1 = (M + eAB)(mod p).
4. Next, Along produces sk = H(eAB) where H is a collision resistant hash
function.
5. Along will then utilize a symmetric algorithm Enc, to produce C2 = Encsk(M).
6. Along will relay (C1, C2, eA) to Busu.
• Decryption by Busu
INPUT: The private key dB and the tuple (C1, C2, eA).
OUTPUT: The message M.
1. Upon receiving ciphertext Busu computes eBA ≡ dBeA(mod p).
2. Busu then computes M’=(C1 − eBA)(mod p).
3. Busu then produces sk = H(eBA)
4. Busu then decrypts C2 with its corresponding symmetric decryption algo-
rithm Dec to produce M = Decsk(C2).
5. If M’ 6=M then abort.
6. Else output M’ which is the message.
Proposition 2. From the above mentioned algorithm eAB = eBA.
Proof. eAB ≡ dAeB ≡ (α˜1β˜1+ α˜2β˜2) ≡ (β˜1α˜1+ β˜2α˜2) ≡ dBeA(mod p) = eBA.
Proposition 3. The encryption process as mentioned above is IND-CCA2 se-
cure.
Proof. This is a sketch. Any change to C1 would result in the decrypted value
from C1 which is M
′ which would differ from M = Decsk(C2) with high proba-
bility. Hence, abort.
Lemma 3. The problem of determining the secret parameters either from eA or
eB is a BFHP.
Proof. It is obvious that with high probability (≈ 2−n - since each gi are co-
prime to each other) that the secret parameters in either eA or eB are unique.
Also, the difference between the secret and public parameters are n-bits, one can
set n = 128.
4 Table of Comparison
Let |E| denote public key size. Let |M | denote the message size. For RSA and
ECC we utilize its parameters within its IND-CCA2 design. In determining the
ciphertext size |C| we also included the public keys to be transmitted (where
applicable). Complexity time is taken in base case scenario deployed via the
Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).
Algorithm Encryption Decryption Ratio Ratio Remark
Speed Speed |M | : |C| |M | : |E|
RSA O(n2 log n) O(n2 log n) 1 : 2 1 : 2 2 parameter ciphertext
of n-bits each
ECC O(n2 log n) O(n2 log n) 1 : 3 1 : 2 2 parameter ciphertext of n-bits each
+ 1 n-bit public key
NTRU O(n log n) O(n log n) Varies [2] N/A
This work O(n log n) O(n log n) 1 : 5 1 : 3 2 parameter ciphertext of n-bits
each + 1 3n-bit public key
Table 1. Comparison table for input block of length n
5 Conclusion
We conclude this work by stating that an efficient asymmetric algorithm has
been disclosed. By having complexity order of O(n log n) for both encryption
and decryption, it would cut ≈ 23 of the running time of algorithms that do not
achieve this speed. Furthermore, it achieves IND-CCA2 security.
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